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What is it, what nameless, 
inscrutable, unearthly thing is it [ ... ] commands 
me [ ... ] recklessly making me ready to do what in my 
own proper, natural heart I durst not so 
much as dare? 
-Ahab-
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Abstract 
Herman Melville sensed that there were certain "truths" which his readers would 
find too painful and threatening to be confronted with directly, so he clothed them 
in the more subtly woven threads of fiction to make them tolerable to the conscious 
mind. We get these truths covertly, indeed, in Moby-Dick, an intimidating work 
whose extraordinarily complex and convoluted imagery interweave to create a 
bewildering three-dimensional maze of ideas. 
This study addresses the strange motivations of the main character Ahab in his 
quest for Moby Dick, using a psychoanalytic orientation to map out the 
interrelationships between four key images: water, the whale, Narcissus, and Ahab. 
I treat the characters as fictional personalities who exemplify certain 
psychological dispositions by using the psychoanalytical theories of Jacques Lacan. 
Our human consciousness, Lacan says, has through language separated us from 
our origins in nature. We feel a longing from the moment we realize we are not 
part of a unified world. This longing corresponds to our desire to return to the 
"pre-oedipal" state in which the infant, incapable of distinguishing between subject 
and object, identifies with external visual images, most typically with the mother. 
This harmonious visual bond with what Lacan calls the "other" is brought to a 
traumatic end by the father's-or society's-prohibition of the child's (incestuous) 
relationship with its mother. 
Instead of being successfully motivated, like most humans, by the castration 
1 
' .. 
complex to break away from the mother and to come to terms with the law of the 
father, Ahab succumbs to it, stagnating at the Oedipal stage, in an attempt to regain 
the visual plenitude he felt he once had. In his anger, Ahab seeks a perpetrator: 
Moby Dick. The whale for Ahab holds not only the secret of unity in his being but 
also the responsibility for Ahab's personal and symbolic "loss", for not only has he 
lost that sense of plenitude we all miss, but he has lost a leg. 
The whale Moby Dick can thus be seen as Ahab's Lacanian father, the visual 
barrier between him and his mother (nature)-the father that breaks the child 
away. Ahab, like all of us, cannot go back to the preverbal world, but unlike most 
of us, he stubbornly keeps trying until he is destroyed. 
2 
• 
INTRODUCTION 
"Dant you buy it dont you read it." 
-Herman Melville1 
''I have written a wicked book," wrote Herman Melville to Nathaniel Hawthorne 
in November of 1851.2 A year earlier, Melville had told his publisher that he 
intended to write "a romance of adventure, founded upon certain wild legends in 
the Southern Sperm Whale Fisheries, and illustrated by the author's own personal 
experiences,"3 but from the start he clearly intended to bring another, in his view 
somewhat "wicked," dimension to the book as well, for in a letter to Rich~rd Henry 
Dana, Jr.-when he was only half-finished with Moby-Dick-he wrote, 
It will be a strange sort of a book, tho', I fear; blubber is blubber you know; 
tho' you may get oil out of it, the poetry runs as hard as sap from a frozen 
maple tree;-& to cook the thing up, one must needs throw in a little fancy, 
1 Melville to Sarah Huyler Mor~.wood, 12 September 1851, reprinted in Norton Critical 
Edition's Moby-Dick (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967), 564. Originally pt1blish~d in J_etters 
of Hemzan Melville, ed. Merrell R. Davis and William H. Gilman (New Haven: Yale UP, 
1960). All further letters are from this collection. Page numbers of the letters as well as all 
page numbers of the work Moby-Dick itself will refer to the above Norton Critical Edition. 
2 Melville to Nathaniel Hawthorne, 17 November 1851, 566. Earlier, Melville had 
written Hawthorne that "the book's motto (the secret one)" was to be "Ego non baptiso 
te in nomine but make out the rest yourself" (29 June 1851, 562). The rest of this motto 
appears in chapter 113 of Moby-Dick: "Ego non baptizo [sic] te in nomine patris, sed in 
nomine diaboli" (404). Perhaps this has something to do with Melville's reference to his 
book as "wicked"-he is searching for a dark, hidden, and in a way evil truth. This motto 
becomes a fundamental theme in my interpretation of this great work. 
3 Melville to Richard Bentley, 27 June 1850, 552. 
3 
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which from the nature of the thing, must be ungainly as the gambols of the 
whales themselves. Yet I mean to give the truth of the thing, spite of this.4 
The "wicked"-ness in Melville's latest work, it.seems, was that he wanted to go after 
the "truth of the thing" -the truth of whaling he meant, perhaps, but also truth 
in general: in poetry, in writing, and in life. But it is a truth which he knew must 
be disguised in the cloak of adventurous fiction and aesthetic language. Melville 
sensed that there were certain things ("truths") which his readers would find too 
painful, too threatening, to be confronted with directly. He felt he must clothe them 
in the more subtly woven threads of fiction, in the mythic language of storytelling, 
to make them tolerable to the conscious mind. "For in this world of lies," he wrote 
in "Hawthorne and his Mosses," "Truth is forced to fly like a scared white doe in 
the woodlands; and only by cunning glimpses will she reveal herself, as in 
Shakespeare and other masters of the great Art of Telling the Truth-even though 
it be covertly, and by snatches."5 
We get these "snatches" of truth covertly, indeed, in Moby-Dick. To so many 
readers, it is an intimidating and even inaccessible work not only because of its 
leviathanic mass, but also because of the extraordinarily complex and convoluted 
imagery which presents an imposing labyrinth for even the most careful reader. 
The work's many recurring images and tiered narrative structure interweave to 
-
create a bewildering three-dimensional maze of ideas. In order to find a way 
through this labyrinth and catch a glimpse, perhaps, of Melville's elusive "truth," 
the reader needs an exegetic guide, an orientation map, be it historical, biographi-
cal, biblical or psychological, upon which the elements of the story can be laid out 
4 Melville to Richard H. Dana, 1 May 1850, 551-552. 
' 
5 Melville, "Hawthorne and his Mosses," in Moby-Dick, Norton Critical Edition (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1967), 542. Originally published in Tlze Literary World, August 17 and 
24, 1850. 
4 
and their interrelationships examined. 
This study will address just one element or aspect of the story of the great white 
whale-the strange motivations of the main character Ahab in his quest for Moby 
Dick-and will attempt to provide an explanation for them, as well as an explana-
tion for the reader's ability to identify with such a character and such motivations. 
To this end, I will use a psychoanalytic orientation to map out the interrelationships 
between some key images in Moby-Dick-specifically those involving water, the 
whale, Ahab, and Narcissus. These images interconnect to reveal a deep psychologi-
cal dimension or "truth" informing the relationship between the White Whale and 
Captain Ahab and help to map out just one of the many ways to travel through 
Moby-Dick's watery maze. 
Though not without qualifications, I think a psychoanalytic approach to 
Melville's novels can be more easily justified and, perhaps, prove more productive 
today than other critical approaches for several reasons. First, as Harold Bloom said, 
"we live more than ever in the Age of Freud,"6 the "father" of modern psychology. 
As literary critics, Bloom continues, we quickly recognize that Freud has become 
"at once the principal writer and the principal thinker of our century,"7 for Freud 
articulated in scientific discourse at the turn of the twentieth century what had 
b already been intuited and explored in literary discourse by the romantics in the 
nineteenth century: the unconscious. He addressed, among other things, the 
relationship between art (literature) and the "larger, darker, deeper part" (161) of 
our psyche, as Melville once described it. In other words, Freudianism is especially 
relevant to literature because, as critic Jeff Adams has succinctly written in a recent 
6 Harold Bloom, Introduction to Sigmund Freud (New York: Chelsea House, 1985), 1. 
7 Bloom, 1. 
5 
essay about the impact of Freud on twentieth century thought, he "created a 
'mythic' language without which we would not know how to talk about our inner 
reality," and which, he continues, "is essentially a theory of meaning or a 
hermeneutic discipline and interpretation its central enterprise."8 Psychoanalytic 
theory, like literary theory, attempts to understand the "hidden" meaning of human 
acts, including and most importantly, the act of linguistic expression. In addition, 
Adams says, "Freud himself defers to the creative writer as his guide because the 
poet interweaves the primary (unconscious) and secondary (conscious) processes 
in symbolic language," and, therefore, "it seems inevitable that the eye of literary 
studies should eventually fix itself on [ ... ] Freudian theory."9 Language is the 
medium of literature, but the psychological processes of the mind are the medium 
of language. Willingly or not, literary theory must now defer to· the Freudian 
presence in the various "mythologies" influencing it, be they psychological, 
epistemological, or sociological, for each of these attempts to come to terms with 
various aspects of existence in the complex modern world. 
Furthermore, I think a psychoanalytic approach is particularly well-suited to 
Melville's work because he was very much a psychological writer, following in all 
his work the nineteenth-century romantic desire to explore the mysterious workings 
of the human soul or spirit which constantly pulled against the rational side of 
man. In typically romantic fashion, Melville, in search of a "hidden truth," focused 
more on the inner turmoils of his characters than on the realistic or natural 
development of.his story line. Claire Kahane and Janice Doane group Melville with 
Faulkner, Poe, and Hawthorne when they state, 
8 Jeffrey Adams, "Review Essay: Literaturpsychologie Today'' in The German Quarterly 6 V4 
(Fall 1988): 540-1. 
9 Adams, 541. 
6 
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our [the United States'] most provocative novelists have probed the contra-
dicticJns c)f experience and desire, creating a tradition of romance in Ameri-
can fiction that, as Richard Chase described it, was less concerned with 
mimetic representatic)ns of man in society than with the interiority of the 
isolated individual. American romance-fiction projected onto a nocturnal 
dream-scape extreme states of mind in unresolvable conflict, obsessed with 
the ubiquitous and timeless motives of desire, fear, and guilt.10 
Melville's works are filled w_ith characters suffering the emotional anguish of a 
tormented soul and searching for something they can never find. They include 
quasi-philosophers who contemplate the mystery of the universe within and mock 
the world without, and Shakespearean fools speaking deep truths about the desires 
and fears of the characters for whom they act as foils. These "timeless 
motives" -desire, fear and guilt-are the essence of Freudian psychology, and a 
psychoanalytic literary approach can perhaps therefore best sort out the threads 
in the weave of a text like Moby-Dick whose pattern is drawn from the inner 
workings of the human mind . 
1° Claire Kahane and Janice Doane, "Psychoanalysis and American Fiction: The 
Subversion of QED," Studies i1z Anzerican Fictio11 9/20 (Autumn 1981): 138. 
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Chapter 1: PSYCHOANALYSIS 
"The Everlasting No." 
-Thomas Carlyle1 
Over the years, essentially four psychoanalytic approachesJo l_iterature have 
developed, each one with a slightly different purpose and a varying degree of 
literary-critical "value". A brief description of them here may help the reader to 
weigh the value and purpose of each approach, as well as of literary analysis in 
general. The oldest and at present least popular form psychoanalyzes the author. 
Psychobiography, as author psychoanalysis has come to be called, has been 
criticized by literary scholars for its tendency to reduce literature to a document , 
.. ,1, 
of psychological study and to disregard 'the "literariness" -the formal, textual, and 
aesthetic features-of the work. Instead, it focuses, they argue, on the work as an 
outgrowth of the author's hidden and suppressed desires which stem from his or 
her early mental development and which are able, under the guise of aesthetic 
1 Thomas Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, bk. 2, the title of chap. 7, as quoted by Tyrus Hillway 
in his Twayne U.S. Authors Series biography ,Herman Melville, rev. ed. (Boston: Twayne 
Press, 1979), 93. 
8 
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form, to bypass the censoring function of the the conscious adult ego. A second 
approach brings to light the psychological motivations of one or several characters 
in the work. This method has been criticized for similar reasons; critics say it 
mistakes the fictive character for a real person with a personal history and 
conscious and unconscious motivations, while again ignoring or overlooking 
aesthetic, formal, and semantic elements of the text. The third and currently most 
popular approach psychoanalyzes the reader by examining the reader's function 
in the unfolding of the text. This approach, too, however, has been attacked by 
critics for bogging itself down in character analysis, though of a 'real' character, 
at the expense of the aesthetic essence of the text.2 The fourth approach, an 
offshoot of author psychoanalysis, attempts to explain the creative act in terms of 
psychoanalytic theory. This method anthropomorphizes the creative work itself, 
treating it as if it were a sentient being with a consciousness and unconscious and 
a psychological history from which the work draws its meaningful imagery. Like 
the other approaches, however, this form, too, is criticized for tending to reduce 
literature to a "mere" object of psychoanalytic study. 
Nonetheless, I do not think that we can reject such approaches out of hand. 
"[W]ith all the cries of 'reductionism,"' Kahane and Doane remind us, "it is easy 
• to forget how psychoanalysis [ ... ] in fact expanded what we could say about the 
text and how it at least promises a rigorous way to discuss 'affect,' or what both 
2 See Peter Brooks, "The Idea of a Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism," in The Trial(s) of 
Psyd1oa11alysis, ed. Francoise Meltzer, (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1987), 145-59, for a strong 
argument against the current forms of psychoanalytic literary criticism. He argues that the 
object of analysis should not be the clarification of themes or the analysis of characters, 
but should rather focus on "the structure and rhetoric of literary texts." He feels it is 
wrong to use psychoanalytic criticism to explore characters or themes, because it reduces 
literary criticism to "identification and labeling of human relations" (146). Therefore, 
psychoanalytic literary analysis should refrain from studying people in the text or authors 
of the text, and instead should work with the text as if the reader were an analyst and the 
text an analysand (i.e., a modified reader-psychoanalysis approach). 
9 
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moves the text and moves us as we read it."3 Though the results of literary 
psychoanalysis may be limited in their interpretive value, they shed much light on 
certain aspects of the genesis and nature of poetic creativity and reception, as well 
as on a possible meaning or "affect'' of a work of art. These results are as such 
perspectives which, when complemented by other critical approaches and methods, 
' 
contribute to understanding the literary work. By way of example, let us take a 
quick representative excursion through four analyses of Moby-Dick, each of which 
uses one or a combination of the four above outlined forms of psychoanalytic 
interpretation. 
Some psychological insights into Moby-Dick of the first type (author-analysis) 
include the observations of William Sack in his article, "Melville and the Theme 
of Individuation in Moby-Dick,"4 about Herman Melville's personal psychological 
I 
I 
history and its relation to the theme of "individuation" in his work. Sack, a rriedical 
doctor, researched Melville's childhood experiences and familial relations to 
determine the source of his richly developed psychological characters. He states that 
Melville, because he had a weak, sensitive father-who died when Melville was 
only thirteen-and an overbearing mother, suffered psychological stresses which 
negatively affected his psychological development. As a result, he always struggled 
with an abnormally strong psychological need for autonomy, and therefore, Sack 
says, "Melville knew something of the cost involved in becoming an 'individual' 
and was able to transpose this personal conflict into timeless, breathtaking prose."5 
Moby-Dick, concludes_ Sack, could thus be seen as a study of the main characters' 
3 Kahane and Doane, 140. 
4 William H. Sack, M.D., "Melville and the Theme of Individuation in Moby-Dick," 
Melville Society Abstracts 55 (September 1983): 7-9. 
5 Sack, 9. 
10 
"relentless striving for freedom and autonomy''6-as a metaphorical series of 
personal struggles in which the characters, like Melville himself, symbolically or 
literally seek to free themselves from the restraints of an authority figure, be it 
mother, father, Moby Dick, or even God himself. Though not without its merits, 
Sack's analysis suffers from a dangerous and unsupportable value judgment when 
he argues that Melville's characters are "great'' because they are manifestations of 
the author's own personal psychological problem. This seems to imply that "great'' 
literature is merely the expression of an author's profound psychological stress, as 
if possessing a deep-psychological problem somehow automatically transforms an 
"ordinary" person into a "great'' artist. Surely the "greatness" of Moby-Dick is more 
than a psychic transcript of Melville's inner life. 
Edwin Schneidman, in his article "Some Psychological Reflections on Herman 
Melville,"7 also focuses on the author-not on his personal psychological history, 
however, but rather on his talent as a psychoanalyst--of fictive personalities. He 
sees "two great psychological insights" put forth in Moby-Dick: "Things are seldom 
what they seem," or "the power of unconscious motivation," and "a spiral view of 
human development [ ... ] an endless interplay of unconscious forces."8 He considers 
Melville the first psychoanalytic theorist, an intuitive researcher who presented his 
theories through the exaggeration of certain psychological traits in his fictional 
characters. Through them, Melville revealed an intuitive understanding of what 
would come to be called Freudian psychology in the next century. "May it not be 
more accurate," queries Schneidman, "to say that Freud was a post-Melvillean than 
6 Sack, 8. 
7 Edwin S. Schneidman, "Some Psychological Reflections on Herman Melville," Melville 
Society Abstracts 47 (November 1985): 7-9. 
8 Schneidman, 7-8. 
11 
to say that Melville was a pre-Freudian?"9 Above all, Schneidman's analysis 
illuminates the high degree to which Melville was in fact able to tap into and 
express the workings of the unconscious even before there was a vocabulary or 
methodology available to articulate it. Such an analysis, though, contributes little 
if anything to a literary-aesthetic understanding of Melville's work, except to imply 
that, in order to write great literature, a writer must be aware of and able to make 
use of the unconscious. 
Although not strictly Freudian, an interesting example of a mixture of the third 
and fourth above mentioned psychoanalytic approaches, executed with the 
assumption that the text ,is a manifestation of a culture, not an author, is Edward 
I 
Edinger's Jungian commentary on Moby-Dick. 10 Edinger uses character analysis 
to explore the meaning in Western culture of certain recurring images in Moby-Dick. 
He describes the book as a psychological document, a record in symbolic imagery 
of an intense inner experience-as though it were a dream which needs 
interpretation"11-a dream of an entire culture, that is. He sees the novel as a 
product of the collective unconscious, a "natural organism, a living psychic product 
of the autonomous imagination, and not a deliberate contrivance of the conscious 
will."12 W/10 wrote the book becomes of very little consequence here. It· is, rather, 
which culture the author comes from that is of crucial importance. He argues that, 
by analyzing its symbolic content (characters, recurring imagery) as the product ~ 
of a people, a culture, and an era, this novel will reveal the "collective Zeitgeist" 
9 Schneidman, 8. 
10 Edward F. Edinger, Melville's Moby-Dick: A Jungian Commentary (New York: A New 
Directions Book, 1978). 
11 Edinger, 1. 
12 Edinger, 5. 
12 
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of its time. The reader is, in a sense, also author, because both presumably share 
the same culture and therefore a psycho-social ground which makes it possible for 
the writer to write the story-using characters that represent the psychological 
11 archetypes" of the culture-and for the reader to understand it. 
Edinger's analysis brings to light the psychological significance and possible 
meaning of a number of images in Moby-Dick. Although I cannot quite accept his 
conclusion that these images fuse and are transformed into a mystical psychological 
experience grounded in innate spiritual knowledge common to all (not just 
culturally specific), I find his interpretive method-analyzing psychologically the 
function/meaning of individual images in the text within a given cultural 
context-useful in achieving a deeper understanding of the text as a whole. 
Yet another analysis, "'The Captive King': The Absent Father in Melville's 
Texts"13 by Regis Durand, psychoanalyzes the characters and the narrative itself, 
a combination of the second and fourth methods mentioned above. Taking a well-
known theory of the Freudian interpreter Jacques Lacan as a focal point, Durand 
argues that the absence of actual fathers (the "nomine patris") and the 
corresponding pervading presence of the father as a symbol (as the "everlasting 
no") are "key psychological and structural element[s]"14 in Melville's works. All 
of Melville's nov~ls, he feels, are structured by the absence of (usually the main 
a • •• ' ~,'" • • • • 
characters') real fathers. This absence, Durand claims, is the driving force of the 
narrative: "images and metaph.ors [ ... ] weave a parallel discourse in which the 
questions of time, origins, and death are subsumed under the idea of paternity."15 
13 Regis Durand, "'The Captive King': The Absent Father in Melville's Texts," in The 
Fictional Fatlzer, ed. Robert Con Davis (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1981), 48-72. 
14 Durand, 49. 
15 Durand, 49. 
13 
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" 
In fact, he argues, "not only is fiction haunted by the return of the vanished father, 
but it wagers its very status and existence as fiction on the question of the symbolic 
father." 16 Durand's argument, although at times highly theoretical and vague, 
manages to go beyond simply psychoanalyzing various main characters in 
Melville's novels; he also uses his character psychoanalyses to interpret the aesthetic 
and formal elements of the text. It is not just a case study of one of Melville's 
characters or of Melville himself, nor merely an exploration of an archetype in the 
generic human psyche, but rather an integrated analysis of a fundamental 
psychological drive. Durand looks at how the significance of a fundamental 
psychological symbol (the father) influenced and contributed to the aesthetic 
success of a specific work of art. 
These analyses provide, I think, valuable and helpful insights into the 
psychological "meaning'' of Herman Melville's works. Leaving the others aside for 
now, I would like to follow Regis Durand's example to examine more closely a form 
of the second approach as it pertains to Moby-Dick, character psychoanalysis, and 
look at what the text's inhabitants might communicate to the readers, as well as 
how they interact with the reader on a psychological level. My focus here is not 
to determine the psychological source or meaning of Moby-Dick in terms of the 
author and his life, or in terms of the text as if it had a life, but rather to 
understand in psychoanalytic terms some of the significance and fascination 
Melville's characters have for the reader-who is of course also a psychological 
being. I do not intend to treat these characters as if they were real-as if they were 
capable of conscious or unconscious decisions. I will treat them, rather, as fictional 
personalities who exemplify certain psychological dispositions which are, generally, 
rooted and inscribed in the socio-linguistic structures of our Western culture. 
16 Durand, 49. 
14 
The fictional characters in a work such as Moby-Dick, I believe, can be viewed 
. 
as a point of convergence of literature and psychology, on the one hand, and socio-
linguistic structures on the other-a convergence which mediates, ultimately, 
between reader, text and author. In this light, the act of reading becomes a 
productive psychoanalytic meeting in the "intermediate region"-to use Freud's 
description of the realm which links analyst and analysand during the process of 
"transference" infahalytic practice-between the reader and the text. Critic Peter 
Brooks, in his article "The Idea of a Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism," has 
suggested such a transferential model of reading which "allows us to take as the 
object of analysis not author or reader, but reading," where "meaning[ ... ] is not 
simply 'in the text' nor fully a fabrication of the reader," nor entirely a product of 
the author-whom Brooks avoids mentioning-"but comes into being in the 
dialogic struggle between the two."17 Interpretation thus always reflects something 
of the reader, that is, something of a person's psychological "investments" which 
interact in the ongoing dialogue with the "investments" contained in the text. "The 
reader necessarily collaborates and competes in the creatioh of textual meaning," 
says Brooks.18 The reader, then, must always contribute to the text, causing it to 
' 
have a slightly different meaning and significance for each reader. 
One way we "collaborate and compete" with a piece of fiction is by identifying 
with the characters. This identification can occur on both a personal and a universal 
human level. We invest meaning and significance in the text because we recognize 
(or project) a co1n1non ele1nent between us and the characters with whom we 
identify. Although I do not go so far as to utilize Brooks' reader-as-analyst, text-as-
17 Brooks, 156. Brooks severely criticizes psychobiography, finding no value in it 
whatsoever as a means of approaching literature, and ignores the author altogether. 
18 Brooks, 154. 
15 
analysand approach, I do agree with his view that reading-the production of 
meaning-"takes place in an 'artificial' space-a symbolic and semiotic 
medium-that is nonetheless the place of real investments of desire from both sides 
of the dialogue."19 Hence my reading of Moby Dick falls mainly into the second 
category of psychoanalytic approaches to literature, namely character (psycho-) 
analysis, but it also attempts to reveal the work's impact"on and interaction with 
the reader as well. 
* * * * * 
' 
One "mapmaker" whose psychoanalytic theories seem to shed more light than 
any other on the story of the White Whale is Jacques Lacan. Often criticized for 
his opaque, almost inaccessible, style (La can himself said he sought "a kind of 
tightening up [ ... ] in order to leave the reader no other way out than the way 
in"),20 Lacan nevertheless managed to found a whole new school of psychoanalytic 
thought. He became known to the psychoanalytic world in the 1930's as a French 
psychoanalyst who "dedicated himself to the task of refinding and reformulating 
the work of Sigmund Freud."21 While Freud's psychological theories emphasize 
the sexual element in human development, implying that all human motivations 
are basically sublimations of the sexual drive, Lacan's works focus on the role of 
19 Brooks, 155. 
20 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1977), 146, as quoted by John P. Muller and William J. Richardson, Lacan and Language, 2nd 
ed. (New York: International UP, 1985), 3. 
21 Juliet Mitchell, Introduction to Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan atzd the Ecole Freudietzne, 
trans. Jacqueline Rose, ed. Juliet Mitchel, and Jacqueline Rose (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1982), 1. 
16 
language (instead of sexual drive) in personality formation. His explorations drew 
• 
him to the conclusion that the unconscious, as Freud had suggested, operates at 
its basic level according to the principles of condensation and displacement-the 
basic methods whereby the unconscious transforms and releases the psychic energy 
of repressed desires via dreams, slips of the tongue, etc. These principles, he pointed 
out, correspond neatly to the linguistic concepts of metaphor and metonymy. This 
correlation between psychoanalysis and language led Lacan to the interpretive 
claim that Freud's "essential message" is about the linguistic nature of the 
unconscious, i.e., "the unconscious is structured in the most radical way like a 
language";22 it is this inherent structural similarity between language and the inner 
workings of the mind which has made Lacan's approach so relevant to literary 
analysis. 
Another significant reinterpretation of Freud by Lacan elaborates how the view 
that the unconscious functions like a language leads to a rethinking of the Freudian 
concept of self or ego. Lacan rejects Freud's later concept of the ego, which 
construes it to be a conscious agent whose function is to see that the subject 
successfully adapts to reality. He argues that Freud had unwittingly reified the ego 
when it should be more effectively viewed as a fictive concept. As the child acquires 
language, Lacan believes, the ego becomes an object, a constructed part of the 
conscious subject, rather than that which constitutes or structures it. 
To understand the significance of this new interpretation of the ego, we must 
go back to Lacan's theory of ego formation, which is centered around the 
psychoanalytic notion that the psyche has a kind of inborn "mirror disposition."23 
22 Lacan, 234. 
23 See Lacan, 1-7 and 16-22 
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Expanding upon the notion of a "looking-glass self" found in the early work of the 
American social psychologists,24 Lacan suggests in his influential "Mirror Stage" 
articlez:; that the human psyche contains a "mirror apparatus" which is 
instrumental in the formation of the concept of self or ego. In order to overcome 
the fragmentary character of its experience-the result of its lack of motor control 
in the early months of existence, which Lacan designates as the Imaginary or 
"mirror-stage" of development-the pre-linguistic human subject (approximately 
between the ages of six and eighteen months) begins to form, with the help of its 
intra-psychic mirror, the concept of a unified self by making visual identifications 
with the world it sees. The so-called "mirror-stage" infant thus enjoys a kind of 
undifferentiated visual symbiosis with its mother and environment. Even at this 
stage, however, when the pre-verbal infant feels a visual unity with mother and 
world, it also senses a vague" organic insufficiency" or "primordial discord" which 
results from its extreme helplessness and uncoordination-what Lacan calls the 
"specific prematurity of [its] birth."26 The infant's psyche thus attempts to 
compensate for its physical immaturity by identifying, aided by its innate "mirror 
apparatus,"27 -with the fixed visual images surrounding it, such as its mother or 
its own reflection, and these identifications, Lacan believes, become the foundation 
for the development of a stable, unified and rigidly structured-but 
fictional concept of a self or ego . 
. !> This tenuous visual unity, however, is broken by the acquisition of language. 
24 Cf. Muller and Richardson, 37. 
25 L , acan, 1-7. 
:u; Lacan, 4. 
ZJ Lacan, 3. 
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In the mirror stage, the infant's first identification of itself as itself occurs as an 
identification with something outside itself and separate from everything around 
it. What the infant is identifying with gives it the sense of bodily unity, despite its 
lack of motor control, but it is "other" than the subject, "exterior to it, hence an 
'alienation' of it."28 Language makes this subject-other separation manifest. In 
learning to speak and say "I," the infant becomes increasingly aware of itself as 
opposed to the surrounding world rather than as a (more or less) undifferentiated 
part of it. It is, then, through language that the child is drawn out of its visual 
unity and forced to function as a subject of an impersonal, inherited symbolic 
system through which it learns to talk about itself as something opposed to the 
world presented in visual experience. It is at this point that "the subject mediated 
by language is irremediably divided because it has been excluded from the symbolic 
chain at the very moment at which it became represented," succinctly concludes 
Fredric Jameson in his article on the Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan.29 
Lacan's far-reaching adjustment of Freud's original theory, which reinterprets 
into linguistic terms the role of the father in the Oedipal complex, comes into play 
here. The father (who need not actually be present) represents the denial to the 
child of the possibility of a continued unity with the mother and world. From the 
infant's perspective, up to this point (the "mirror-stage"), the mother and child have 
enjoyed a dual relationship; the child has felt itself undifferentiated from mother 
and world. The father then steps into the child's world between it and its mother 
as a prohibiting third term. 
Crucial to the Lacanian linguistic recasting of the Oedipal crisis is the 
28 Muller and Richardson, 30. 
29 Fredric Jameson, "Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, Psychoanalytic Criticism, and the Problem of the Subject," Yale French Studies, 55/56 (1977): 363. 
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controversial "phallocentricism" (Lacan's term) of the whole symbolic order of 
language30 which, Lacan contends, builds from a (metaphoric) displacement and 
(metonymic) rechanneling of denied and prohibited desire for the mother. It is a 
desire which he characterizes in an essay on the treatment of psychosis as "the 
desire for her desire" whereby the subject "identifies himself with the imaginary 
object of this desire in so far as the mother herself symbolizes it in the phallus."31 
The phallus represents not only the father as a prohibiting third term but also a 
kind of primal desire for an imaginary unity and comes to signify as such the 
separation from, as well as loss of, the mother. The term "phallus" is a 
quintessential symbol, which, as Serge Leclaire puts it, becomes (retroactively) "the 
signifier of the impossible identity"32 of mother and child, subject and object. It 
is a central but problematic signifier in what Lacan calls the "paternal metaphor," 
which issues from the primordial suppression of desire for the mother and which 
in turn gives rise to the need for the other metaphoric/metonymic substitutions of 
language. 
As possessor of the phallus, then, the father represents that which the mother 
~ ~-
desires. At the same time, he also represents language, that from which all social . 
demands come. This third term, "the name of the father" (what Melville calls "in 
nomine patris") or "the law of the father," is the set of social laws, as expressed 
through language, that the child must accept and adhere to in order to take its 
proper place in society. The first "law" it learns is that incest is forbidden, i.e., that 
the mother, who represents for the child that visual unity which it has just lost, 
30See Lacan, 197-202. 
31 Lacan, 198. 
32Quoted by Muller and Richardson, 23. 
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cannot be reunited with it, nor can it become the object of the mother's desire (i.e., 
the phallus). The mother is lost to the child not by any physical interference of a 
real father, but by the sy1nbolic interference of the father's name-language, or the 
laws imposed through language-which has separated the child from a unity with 
the world and mother forever. 
In order to become a unified "I" (which, it turns out, is an alienating process) 
the~~ the infant must give up its feeling of unity with the world and mother. Yet 
the infant still desires this unity which it can now never regain (having never really 
had it), giving birth to a permanent desire-" desire for the other's desire," as Lacan 
calls it. 
Since this transformation from visual unity to linguistic alienation is always, to 
a certain degree, associated with trauma, it can produce feelings of anxiety, 
paranoia and aggression, and even a subliminal longing to return to the pre-
linguistic security of "mirror-stage" visual identifications with the perceived world. 
Language is acquired at the expense of the "mirror-stage" "specular I" and the 
security of its visual link with its environment; the acquisition of language is as 
such part of the alienating process of socialization-"the deflection of the specular 
I to the social 1"33-which marks and articulates the child's traumatic departure 
from its relatively undiffer~µtiated visual connection to mother and world. This 
process of socialization, only part of the more general process of ego formation, 
engenders "paranoiac alienation" because the world, which is now coming into 
clearer focus, is experienced as an increasingly problematic threat to the pre-Oedipal 
("mirror-stage") ego's security and (narcissistic) sense of self-sufficiency. First, the 
child is "wrenched away from a dyadic relationship with its mother," away from 
a sense of unity with her and the world, which causes the child to "now relate to 
33 Lacan, 5. 
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her through a dialectic of desire."34 Then, "traumatized," it "desires, to recapture 
its lost plenitude by being the desired of its mother, her fullness-in Lacanian 
language, by being the phallus for its mother."1c; But this becomes impossible 
because "the father (who has the phallus) is there: the real father, the imaginary 
father, and most of all the symbolic father, i.e., the 'law of the father' -the symbolic 
order, structuring all human relationships and making it possible that absence 
become present through language."36 Language is thus both the source and 
expression of unconscious desire, the product of the human subject's inexorable 
existential estrangement. 
This part of the Oedipal stage corresponds to Freud's theory of the castration 
complex. The child must accept the law of the father in order to fit "normallf' into 
society. If it does not accept the law, and rejects it or attempts to deny or destroy 
it ("kill" the father), the child must remain outside culture: "failure to find the 
father commits the son to living in a narcissistic world outside family and 
culture."37 
In that Lacan's structural project moves psychoanalysis away from a 
preoccupation with the individual subject, i.e., the Freudian ego, to a more general 
sociological plane, i.e., language and social structures, his theories allow us to 
explore a more universal level 'oi significance in a literary work. At the same time, 
34Muller and Richardson, 23. 
35 Muller and Richardson, 23. 
36 Muller and Richardson, 23. 
37 Robert Con Davis, in his introduction to The Fictio11al Father, ed. Robert Con Davis 
(Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1981), 11. There are problems with Lacan's version 
of the castration complex, as well as with Freud's, and Con Davis blatantly though 
unwittingly points this out in his discussion of the relationship of father to so11 only. The 
castration threat only poorly explains the problem of the "law of the father'' for the female 
child. 
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they serve as an antidote to the genetic preoccupations of orthodox Freudian 
approaches which focus on the author and his psycho-biography as the source or 
origin of the poetic impulse. In placing the incjividual subject within a cultural-
~ 
psychological context constitutive of both individual and collective, a Lacanian 
approach also moves literary psychology away from problematic speculations about 
infantile maladjustment of individuals and ultimately the Victorian familial values 
from which Freudian psychoanalysis sprang. By examining, then, the characters 
in Moby-Dick as individuals who are at the same time representations of a larger 
human psychodrama, dependent upon the personal psychological history of neither 
Melville the author nor the characters-but rather upon the psycholinguistic history 
of the collective experience of the individuals in our culture-we can come to 
understand more deeply and fully our own dilemma as members of a human 
linguistic community. 
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Chapter 2: WATER AND NARCISSUS 
"In landlessness alone resides 
the highest truth." 
-Herman Melville1 
The symbolic significance of the water motif in Moby-Dick becomes apparent in 
the first chapter-already in the first paragraph, in fact. Here, Ishmael explains that 
the sea is his alternative to suicide; while "Cato throws himself upon his sword," 
he says, "I quietly take to the ship" (11). It is his source of rejuvenation, of 
rekindling his desire to live, and, he adds "[ ... ] almost all men in their degree, some 
time or other, cherish very nearly the same feelings towards the ocean with me" 
(11). There is something mag1i1etic about it; there is "magic in it," he says. It draws 
' 
· all men "back" to it-back to the source of all life, for not only did the first· livin'g 
organisms develop, somehow, from the ingredients of ordinary sea water, but 
mammals are born of water as well. Water is both literally (it is the primary 
substance of the body) and spiritually ("[ ... ] as everyone knows, water and 
meditation are wedded forever," says Ishma~l [13]) an integral part of man. The 
1 Herman Melville, Moby-Dick, Norton Critical Edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967), 
97. All subsequent page references in the text refer to this work. 
(, 
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bubbling of a meandering stream is one of the most soothing sounds in nature, and 
the quiet roar of soft, rolling summer ocean waves can rock one to sleep like a 
mother humming a lullaby. Ishmael describes this soothing feeling in chapter 35, 
"The Mast-Head." Falling into a kind of trance or dream-state high above the 
human world of the ship, a man (the ship's lookout) finds momentary unity with 
watery nature. While the lookout stands far above the deck watching for whales, 
"at last he loses his identity [and] takes the mystic ocean at his feet for the visible 
image of that deep, blue, bottomless soul, pervading mankind and nature" (140). 
But it cannot last: 
But while this sleep, this dream is on ye, move your foot but an inch; slip 
your hold at all and your identity comes back in horror. [ ... ] And perhaps 
[ ... ] with one half-throttled shriek you drop through that transparent air into 
the summer sea, no more to rise for ever. (140) 
The sweet allure, the lullaby of nature's oceans, turns out to be like the song of the 
sirens in Greek mythology. By enchanting passing sailors with their voices, the 
sirens caused them to dash their ships on hidden shoals, sending them to their 
deaths. So, it would seem, despite our connections to it, the splendor of the watery 
world is really not accessible to humanity. 
Thus, water has a primal though potentially fatal attraction for man because it 
is the origin and primary ingredient of all things-including himself-and .. ·· 
therefore, Ishmael argues, it contains the secret of life. It is itself, says Ishmael, a 
living being: "There is, one knows not what sweet mystery about this sea, whose 
gently awful stirrings seem to speak of some hidden soul beneath" (399). Yet, 
· paradoxically, it forever eludes and even threatens man; the great bodies of water 
covering two-thirds of the earth can never be brought under his control: "however 
baby man may brag of his science and skill [ ... ] yet for ever and for ever, to the 
crack of doom, the sea will insult and murder him, and pulverize the stateliest, 
25 
stiffest frigate he can make[ ... ]" (235). Man's skill and science cannot appropriate 
the sea, nor can it help him return to that which the sea represents-unity with 
the "deep, blue, bottomless soul" of nature/the world. "No mercy, no power but 
its own controls it'' (235), Ishmael says. He must remain at its mercy and above its 
surface, because the lure of man's origins is combined with the unattainable, the 
incomprehensible, and the eternal that mankind desires and can never achieve. 
From a Lacanian view, the sea is that which the adult is not, yet desires most 
to be: timeless, all-powerful, autonomous, and unified; it is an elusive secret which 
even (our science cannot grasp. The sea and its contents enjoy a timeless unity 
undisturbed by alienating human constructs-such as consciousness and language. 
Going back to the water is like going back to the womb, to a time when, 
psychologically speaking, the subject felt a sense of unity with mother (nature) and 
world. 
Still another and related attraction to water is, Ishmael muses, the same which 
Narcissus felt; like the self-absorbed youth of Greek mythology, we want, upon 
looking into the water, to grasp the spell-binding, familiar image we see on its 
surface: "that same image, we ourselves see in all rivers and oceans. It is the image 
of the ungraspable phantom of life; and this is the key to it all" (14). When our 
gaze falls upon water, we reassuringly see our own unified image, our self. 
There are a number of references in Moby-Dick to gazing at reflections in the 
water. The first is the result of some advice given to Ishmael by Captain Bildad in 
chapter 16. If you want to "see the world" he tells Ishmael, then "just step forward 
there and take a peep over the weather-bow" (70). In other words, if you want to 
see the world, look into_ the water, which is just what Ishmael then discovers. At 
this point, however, Ishmael has not yet learned to "read" the water and does not 
realize that he does not see "not much[ ... ] nothing but water" (70), but, if he looks 
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carefully, he will see himself reflected on the water's surface, suggesting a 
connection between him and the sea which he already senses. 
Like Ishmael, we want to join that image in the water to become one again with 
it and nature. According to Lacanian theory, we are separated from the world 
because, through language, we become conscious of ourselves as beings opposed 
to and separate from all other things. Our human consciousness, in order to 
organize our world, has through language placed us necessarily in opposition to 
everything else, and thus finalized our separation from our origins in nature. 
Therefore, the child (and adult), in its desire to regain what it feels it has lost, learns 
to name that which is absent in an attempt to call it forth again. For the basic 
function of language is to talk about things which are not always present to the 
speaker. In other words, the word replaces the thing. The object being identified 
is replaced by its identifier (its name). When we talk about a cat, for example, the 
cat must not necessarily be present in order for us to talk about it. The physical 
object "cat'' is replaced by the word and becomes an abstra.ction no longer 
connected to the original animal, to nature, or to the word itself. In this sense 
language becomes a filler as well as a creator of a void. 
While we sense in this external image of ourselves seen in mirrors and on the 
surface of water a recognizable, harmonious, unified world of which we seem to 
be a part'"_ we are only a part of this world in its reflection, not in its "true" 
presence. Just like Narcissus, we are at the same time remind~cl ·,at our owri., .. lost 
unity with nature-the "ungraspable phantom" -and long to be reconnected with 
it because, even though we see our reflection in nature, we know that we ourselves 
stand outside of it-we are not our reflections. 
This longing corresponds to our desire to return to the ''pre-oedipal" state in 
which the unself-conscious infant, incapable of distinguishing between subject and 
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object, identifies with external visual images it .sees, most typically that of the 
mother. This harmonious visual bond or identity with what Lacan calls the "other'' 
is, according to Lacan, brought to a traumatic end by the father's or 
society's-prohibition of the child's (incestuous or symbiotic dual) relationship with 
its mother. As such, language eliminates the potential for unity with mother and 
world while, ironically, becoming the only medium through which the child can 
attempt such a reunification. 
Later, Ishmael, as well as Ahab, looks into the water and sees other images, 
what could be c~nsidered symbolic reflections of different aspects of himself. Of 
particular imporlance, however, is the fact that neither character sees a clear and 
/ 
unalteredr 1 image of himself in the water's reflection at any point. This 
) 
misrecognition has partly to do with the fact that the subjects in this work have 
not fully come to terms with the "law of the father," and partly with the fact that 
this disunity is unresolvable. Ishmael and Ahab, as the two main subjects, are still 
struggling to regain the lost unity with the mother. Like the small child, these two 
still unconsciously recognize themselves as something alien-" other" -and so see 
themselves as something other than themselves, often as something threatening 
because what they see is "other." So when Ishmael, or Ahab, looks into the water, 
he sees simply water, or a baby whale, or the Parsee, or Moby Dick, but never his 
own unperverted reflection. (Moby Dick, on the other hand, has no reflection, 
because he is unified, one, with nature.) 
Ishmael, however, learns to accept permanent alienation through his 
philosophical relationship to nature. At least three times in the story he is 
threatened with annihilation as a result of coming too close to or facing the full 
power of "Mother Nature," or, defying the "law of the father." Ahab, too, is given 
three warnings, directly from Moby Dick in the final three chapters, in fact, but 
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while he ignores them and pushes doggedly on, Ishmael learns his lesson from his 
experiences on the Pequod, and heeds the natural warnings he receives. The first 
such encounter, already mentioned above, occurs while he is standing watch at the 
mast-head. The serene blue waters and soothing rocking of the ship set his mind 
adrift allowing him to float toward reunification with the nature he stands watch 
over. "Those seductive seas," he says, are "an asylum for many romantic, melancholy 
and absent-minded young men" like himself (139). "In this enchanted mood, thy 
spirit ebbs away to whence it came" (140), but he quickly realizes that beneath these 
serene waters, "this velvet paw but conceals~ remorseless fang" (405). If he allows 
I 
I ( 
himself to slip wholly into that feeling of u~ity he wants to enjoy, he will also slip 
I 
to his death, falling, never to rise again, into the bottomless ocean beneath him: 
"But while this sleep [ ... ] is on ye [ ... ] slip your hold at all; and your identity comes 
back in horror" (140). 
Ishmael's second warning is not actually a single event, but rather a gradual 
realization, as he contemplates the significance of the whiteness of the whale Moby 
Dick. He begins by saying "what, at times, [Moby Dick] was to me" included a 
"rather vague, nameless horror [ ... ]. It was the whiteness of the whale that above 
all things appalled me" (163). Once again, although Ishmael allows himself to be 
drawn toward the unattainable (nature), and this time by a father-figure (Ahab) 
who binds all the crew to him with an oath of revenge on Moby Dick (the "father's" 
words) in chapter 36, he does it with a healthy sense of fear. He is aware of the 
law of the father and fears defying it: "my oath had been welded with theirs [ ... ] 
and more did I hammer and clinch my oath, because of the dread in my soul" (155). 
He senses fron1 the start that there is something dangerously unacceptable about 
attempting to destroy the great white whale, because it defies a basic law-the "law 
-
of the father." Ironically, Ishmael is following the "law" of one father in order to 
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defy the law of another. As captain of the crew, Ahab is a father figure-a leader 
and a rule maker. Even though Ahab refuses this paradigm himself, the crew place 
him in it automatically, as the captain of the ship who gives verbal orders. They 
expectantly await and follow, and this is what makes his terrible quest after Moby 
Dick, in a way, so easy. However, since Ahab himself has not learned to sublimate 
and accept the law, he represents a perversion of it. He is therefore a contradictory 
character in that while he represents the "law of the father" for the crew, he himself 
has no father-he has renounced him and his authority-and is attempting to 
destroy his law. When the crew take their oath, then, they must follow him to his 
death, for no one can defy the father's law and survive. While the rest of the crew 
is drowned with Ahab, though, Ishmael is saved, perhaps because of the "dread" 
in his soul. He seems to realize that Ahab's "law" is not complete, that in order for 
the "law" to be complete it must be accepted and assimilated, not conquered. 
The third natural warning Ishmael experiences occurs as he stands watch at the 
tiller one evening while looking into the try-works fire. In the next sentence, 
however, he finds himself looking in the wrong direction, into the pitch black 
nothingness of the night sea, so that for a moment he does not know where he is. 
He has allowed himself to be hypnotized by the allure of nature in one of her more 
dangerous primordial forms, fire, nearly capsizing the boat and bringing on the 
destruction of the entire vessel and crew. After this experience he says, "The sun 
hides not the ocean, which is the dark side of this earth" (355); some of the darkest 
truths are hidden in light, not darkness, and as Ishmael looked into the fire, he, 
"wrapped in darkness, but better saw the redness, the madness, the ghastliness of 
others [ ... ]. Look not too long into the face of the fire [ ... ] lest it invert thee, deaden 
thee" (354-5). Ishmael realizes his limitations as a· member of the human linguistic 
community and understands that he must resist the temptation to sink into the 
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soothing oblivion of the natural realm because he is able to see the danger in it. 
His experiences teach him that it is dangerous to lose one's identity, to be 
"inverted," that is, to regressively seek to go backwards to the mirror stage in search 
of unity with the "all". 
The first line of the book, "Call me Ishmael"(12), draws attention to the fact that 
he has now accepted the human condition. By this simple statement, Ishmael 
announces that he now (many years after his experience on the Pequod) identifies 
himself through the medium of language, that he has accepted "the law of the 
father," that he knows and is willing to follow the rules of society. Ahab, however, 
rejects the state of human existence, thus driving himself to inevitable isolation and 
(self-)destruction in the face of the unconquerable law. 
It is upon this deep, liquid (Lacanian) stage, then, that the drama of Ishmael's 
and Ahab's struggles with their "others", or language, is performed. 
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Chapter 3: AHAB AND THE WHALE 
"And damn me, Ahab, but thou 
actest right; Live in the 
game, and die in it!" 
-Stubb1 
Ishmael goes to sea not only because he consciously seeks spiritual rejuvenation 
and feels an irresistable primordial attraction to the water, but also because he 
unconsciously hopes to realize that attraction, to regain at least a partial pre-oedipal 
unity with Mother Nature through being on the water, if not in it. He realizes that 
the world of nature enjoys a certain tranquility which he cannot attain, that the 
whale, for example, lives a happier life than he ever will. Ishmael is an optimist, 
however, and at one point suggests that we must strive to "return to nature" 
despite the fact that it is impossible. We strive, to put it in the figural language of 
the novel, to imitate the whale who is "back" in the watery womb, who has never 
left that happy union: "Oman, admire and model thyself after the whale! [ ... ]live 
in this world without being of it" (261). He feels the separation as strongly as any 
-
~,.,. 
1 Herman Melville, Moby-Dick, Norton Critical Edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967), 
413. All subsequent page references in the text refer to this work. 
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human, but refuses to despair and does not attempt to fight against-tit. 
Ahab apparently goes to sea for another reason, but we soon discover his 
motives are none too different from Ishmael's. He is in pursuit of the great white 
whale, in pursuit of the answer to a question about the secret of life which, he 
feels, only the whale can provide. Says Ahab: "Speak, mighty head, and tell us the 
secret thing that is in thee[ ... ]" (264). His question, though, is really a quest to find 
one whale, the great white whale Moby Dick. But why pursue a monstrous and 
dangerous whale for such an answer? Why not a tiger-or a mouse, which Walt 
Whitman once suggested was as good a source as any for discovering life's secret?2 
Aside from the more obvious fact that Ahab is a whaler and knows this animal best, 
the answer seems again to be (partly) in the primordial significance of water which 
Ishmael so strongly feels. The whale lives in the salt-water medium out of which 
man was born and in which he no longer can survive. It thrives in the element, 
the original womb-water, while man must face life on land, separated from his 
origins. Yet the whale is (distantly) related to man; like him, it is a mammal whose 
females give birth to dependent babies for whom they produce milk. Unlike man, 
though, who often finds nature his adversary and must struggle to overcome it in 
order to survive, the whale has been self-sufficient from the start, because it is 
nature, part of the powerful, enticing, teasing element which can destroy man in 
a moment. In Chapter 87, "The Grand Arn1ada," Ishmael describes how 
harmoniously the whale lives in the natural realm. Here, as the crew look down 
into the water, they see "suspended in those watery vaults floated the forms of the 
nursing mothers of the whales[ ... ] the babies[ ... ] looking up towards us but not 
2 
"[A]nd a mouse is miracle enough to stagger sextillions of infidels." Walt Whitman, 
from "Song of Myself," in Leaves of Grass, ed. Sculley Bradley et al. (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1973), 59. 
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at us [ ... ] spiritually feasting upon some unearthly reminiscence" (325). These 
"inscrutable creatures," explains Ishmael, "freely and fearlessly [ did] indulge in all 
the peaceful concernments" (326) of life, enjoying a paradisical unity in and with 
nature, with their mothers, never having to leave the womb-water, while man sits 
so far removed from their world that he is not even visible to them. 
The whale, Ishmael explains, is also part of that primordial-ness because it has 
existed since "that wondrous period ere time itself can be said to have begun; for 
time began with man" (380). The whale has a kind of immortality, for not only was 
it around before man, but it, "having been before all time, must needs exist after 
all humane ages are over" (380). The whale is primordial in two senses, not only 
in its immortality, but also in its autonomy even from God, for it apparently lives 
independent of the divine, and, having no natural enemies or rivals, is lord of its 
world. The whale is also beyond God, in that it did not require divine intervention, 
as Noah and the other animals did, to survive the flood. Ishmael explains the 
whale's privileged position thus: 
[W]e account the whale immortal in his species, however perishable in his 
individuality. He swam the seas before the continents broke water; he once 
swam over the site of the Tuileries, and Windsor Castle, and the Kremlin. 
In Noah's flood he despised Noah's Ark; and if ever the world is to be again 
flooded, like the Netherlands, to kill off its rats, then the eternal whale will 
still survive, and rearing up on the topmost crest of the equatorial flood, 
spout his frothed defiance to the skies. (385) 
One reason the whale maintains its autonomy, psycho-symbolically speaking, 
is that it, like all animals, remains outside of language (it does not speak) and 
therefore cannot be brought under the law of (God) the father.3 The whale is thus 
3 The whale, like God, exists in a priviledged realm beyond human social laws, beyond 
language. Consider, for example, the tradition in the Jewish religion that the name of God 
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divine because it remains beyond the confines of language, 
like all nature, 
answering to no one and alienated by nothing. And, like God, w
hat separates the 
whale from man is language (the Word). According to Lacan, language destro
ys 
or prevents the possibility for autonomy in man because it is the
 barrier, the law, 
the impersonal authority which inscribes the human social orde
r. The whale, on 
the other hand, remains in the unified, autonomous realm of non
linguistic nature, 
an integral, inseparable part of it. 
In addition to its quasi-divine qualities, the whale is physically
 an ominous 
representative of nature; like the water it lives in, it is "unfatho
mable". It stands 
for an alluring, yet powerful, defiant and flaunting, impenetr
able nature. The 
whale, perhaps, of all the living beings in nature, by its size, its ub
iquity (it is found 
in all the oceans), its mysteriousness (hiding at unfathomable depths), and its un
ity 
with nature in water, is for man the most awe-inspiring and envi
able of creatures. 
As Ahab declares to a whale's head in Chapter 70, "The Sphinx
": " Of all divers, 
thou hast dived the deepest.[ ... ] has[t] moved amid this world's foundation
s.[ ... ] 
in that awful waterland, there was thy most familiar home.[ ... ] Oh head! tho
u hast 
seen enough to split the planets and make an infidel of Abrah
am, and not one 
syllable is thine!( ... ]" (264). The whale, Ahab feels, both lives where we cannot a
nd 
senses what we cannot because its consciousness is not insc
ribed within the 
patrocentric authorities of an alienating linguistic system. 
The whale for Ahab holds not only the secret of unity in his bein
g but also the 
responsibility for Ahab's personal and symbolic "loss". Ahab there
fore has a second 
reason for taking to the sea. He seeks revenge on the great w
hite whale, Moby 
n1ay not be written, may not be dragged down to the human lev
el of alienating labels, 
because He is too great for ordinary human language. The whale,
 too, is greater than the 
limits of language. 
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Dick, for dismembering him, for symbolically "castrating'' him. When Moby Dick 
reaped away Ahab's leg, he literally-physically executed what all human beings 
metaphorically-psychologically-are at a stage in their development confronted 
with. Ahab finds himself in the midst of what psychoanalysts call the "castration 
complex," a natural and necessary psychological stage (part of the Oedipal complex) 
which children must work through in order to develop a normal psyche. According 
to Freud, "the castration complex is of the profoundest importance in the formation 
alike of character and of neurosis."4 It "governs the position of each person in the 
triangle of father, mother, and child" and as such it "embodies the law that founds 
the human order itself."5 Ahab's castration complex is unlike the average person's, 
however, because he never comes to terms with it, never emerges from it. Instead, 
he remains trapped as an ad111t at a near-infantile stage of development. There are 
two aspects of this complex relevant to the story of Ahab and Moby Dick: the "law 
of the father" (and its consequences) and aggression. 
In Lacan's mirror stage schema, the castration complex arises as the child comes 
up against the law of the father. The infant, once it discovers it cannot regain the 
unity with Mother that it once felt, begins to desire that which it feels it has lost. 
The child comes to believe that the only way it can regain this unity is by somehow 
making Mother desire it rather than that which the child feels she has rejected it 
for and because of-the phallus. This means that, in a sense, the child n1ust become 
the phallus. The phallus for the child, then, is that image which symbolizes the law 
4 Quoted by Juliet Mitchell, in her introduction to Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacatz and 
tlie Ecole Frei,die1z11e, trans. Jacqueline Rose, ed. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1982), 13. Original source: Tlze Sta11dard Edition of the Complete 
Psyd1ological Works of Sigmu11d Freud, vol. 20 (London: Hogarth, 1953-74), 37. Originally 
published 1925. 
5 Mitchell, 14. 
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and authority of the father. The child thus itself wants to become the law of the 
father so that it again can possess the mother: "Traumatized by its want, the child 
I 
wants, i.e., desires, to recapture its lost plenitude by being the desired of its mother, 
i 
her fullness-in Lacanian language, by being the phallus for its mother."6 But the 
father prevents this because he already has the phallus in all its symbolic (and 
literal) significance. Thus the child comes to feel it has "lost'' the phallus, or the 
symbolic value of the phallus, in that it has lost its undisturbed connection to its 
mother. The desire to be the mother's desire, what Lacan calls "the desire for the 
other's desire," is what leads ultimately to the castration complex and its resolution. 
The child feels a ''radically and humanly unsatisfiable yearning [ ... ] for the lost 
paradise of complete fusion with its all"7 which can never be fulfilled. In order to 
survive this loss, "the child's desire, its endless quest for a lost paradise, must be 
channelled like an underground river through the subterranean passageways of 
the symbolic order"8-through the indirect world of language. 
Once the child is confronted with the castration complex, it has two choices; 
either it must accept the father's law and come to identify with the parent of the 
same sex, thereby entering into a nonsexual (and therefore nonthreatening) 
relationship with both parents and with the world of language, or the child "fails" 
to accept the law of the father, forcing it into a narcissistic life outside of language 
and society: "If the specific mark of the phallus, the repression of which is the 
6 John P. Muller and William J. Richardson, Lacan and Language, 2nd ed. (New York: 
International UP, 1985), 23. 
7 Muller-Richardson, 22 
8 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), 
31. 
~ 37 
,. 
JI 
l 
--...,,·· 
institution of the law, is repudiated, then there can only be psychosis."9 Since the 
law of the father is language, if the child is unable to accept the law, then it will · 
suffer a "linguistic flaw." This "flaw", Lacan explains, is an inability to fully 
transform the unmediated "real" world of images into the symbolic world of 
language. This is what Jameson characterizes as the problem of the "imaginary and 
symbolic." In other words, the infant begins life in a world of images (the 
"imaginary" stage) which have no specific reference or meaning. As the child 
progresses into language, each image becomes symbolic, obtaining a "reference 
value."10 The symbolic is what allows us to "organize and situate the 
imaginary,"11 but if the progression from the imaginary to the symbolic is 
interrupted by unresolved trauma (if the father's law is "repudiated"), the symbolic 
may lose its "reference value"12 and regress back to the imaginary. 
This is precisely what happens,. it could be argued, to Ahab. Instead of being 
successfully motivated by the casltion complex to break away from the mother 
and to come to terms with the law of the father, Ahab succumbs to it, stagnating 
at the Oedipal stage, in an attempt to regain the visual plenitude he felt he once 
had. 
Ahab, like all of us, cannot go back to the preverbal world, but unlike most of 
9 Mitchell, 19. The difference between psychotics and neurotics, Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari write in a similar vein, is the difference between "those who do not tolerate 
oedipalization, and those who tolerate it and are even content with it and evolve within 
it. Those on whom the Oedipal imprint does not take, and those on whom it does." Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A11ti-Oedipus: Capitalisn1 and Sdzizopl1renia, trans. Robert Hurley, 
et al (New York: Viking, 1977), 124. 
1° Fredric Jameson, "Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, Psychoanalytic 
Criticism, and the Problem of the Subject," Yale Frend1 Sti,dies, 55/56 (1977): 350-1. 
11 Jameson, 360. 
12 Jameson, 350-1. 
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us, he stubbornly keeps trying because he is suffering from what Regis Durand 
calls "the missing father." In his essay "'The Captive King': The Absent Father in 
Melville's Text,"13 Durand points out that both mothers and fathers are 
,, .- -- "' 
'-..._ -----· '---' / 
"conspicuously absent'114 in all Melvinz-s works. He explains the absence of 
mothers by countering that "the longing is there."15 In Lacanian terms, this makes 
sense, because in normal psychological development, the mother is replaced by the 
law of the father; only the desire for the mother (or for her desire) remains. 
Again, like all of us, Ahab wants to return to the pre-mirror stage feeling of 
unity with mother and world, but again, unlike so-called healthy, socialized people, 
he is not able to accept the "impossibility of returning to an archaic preverbal 
stage."16 This "impossibility'' is symbolized in the story by the early death of 
Ahab's mother (the "loss" of unity) and by the complete absence of any father (we 
are told that Ahab's father died before he was born). In Lacanian terms, Ahab's 
missing father is the "missing paternal authority which gives rise to language and 
culture."17 This means that Ahab will never be able to come to terms with the law 
of the father (the "Everlasting No") because he has never confronted it. Nor will 
he progress beyond the Oedipal stage into normal adult social intercourse. Ahab, 
then, rejects the father's law by virtue of its inaccessibility. 
Ishmael/the narrator speaks of Ahab's attitude toward the world at one point, 
describing it as "the step-mother world, so long cruel-forbidding'' (443). To Ahab, 
13 Regis Durand, "'The Captive King': The Absent Father in Melville's Texts," in The 
Fictio1zal Fatlzer, ed. Robert Con Davis (Amherst: UP of Massachusetts, 1981), 48-72. 
14 Durand, 48. 
15 Durand, 48. 
16 Jameson, 359. 
17 Jameson, 353. 
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the world (land) is like a false or "bad" mother who has rejected and/or abandoned 
him. He cries for his "lost" mother who died soon after he was born, and whose 
absence caused him to abandon the worldly, normal life on land, for a lifelong 
search for the unknown father, upon whom he desires to vent his rage. But his 
missing "father" remains concealed in the sea: "for forty years has Ahab forsaken 
the peaceful land, for forty years to make war on the horrors of the deep!" (443), 
He has abandoned that which he may not have for that which he cannot conquer. 
The act of rejecting the law of the father is an act of aggression, but the origins 
of infantile aggression go farther back than the Oedipal. The child experiences 
alienation early on when it begins to realize it is not one with its mother, but a 
separate being, and, according to Lacan, such alienation produces aggression: 
11 Aggressjvity is the 'correlative tendenc.y' of this identification by which the ego 
(and its world) is constituted [ ... ]. aggressivity arises when the ego encounters 
another subject like himself and there awakens in him a desire for the object of the 
other's desire."18 The child's narcissistic desire for unity produces tension, or 
11 energy" which II converts into primitive aggressivity whenever the integration-i.e., 
the fragile unity" of the child's self is threatened by, for example, a father figure 
or even by an external image of itself, such as the image it sees in a mirror.19 This 
unity is extremely fragile because it is a fiction~there never really was a unity. 
Since "the subject is structured as a rival with himself,"20 the subject alienates 
itself, which causes it to feel aggression toward itself whenever its security seems 
threatened: "The alienating function of the I releases as aggressivity as the ego 
18 Muller-Richardson, 48. 
19 Muller-Richardson, 49. 
20 Lacan, 22. See discussion, chap. 1. 
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develops."21 So, not only is the law of the father, or process of socialization, an 
alienating process, which can turn into aggression, but the child itself (its "ego") 
sees itself as alientating (the image in the mirror). The act of sublimation, of 
accepting the father's law, is the act of suppressing aggression toward the father 
and the self. 
We see in Ahab many signs of aggression toward others as well as toward 
himself. One typical image which characterizes aggression toward the self is 
fragmentation of the body. Ahab's body is not only literally fragmented, in that one 
of his legs is missing, but also figuratively, in that he never sees his own image, 
but rather those of others-the whale's at one point, and the Parsee's: '' Ahab 
chanced so to stand that the Parsee occupied his shadow" (278). His shadow is even 
described as sinking away from "his gaze, the more and the more he strove to 
pierce the profundity'' of it (443). Such descriptions register the fragmentation of 
his psyche, his personality. He has no unified self (none of us has one, really, but 
we have learned to invent one, to pretend that we do). 
Seen in this light, Ahab's aggression, baffling at times, makes more sense. The 
intensity of his hatred/obsession with the White Whale is incomprehensible within 
the surface action of the story and goes far beyond the bounds of acceptability for 
someone who wants revenge for losing a leg. At one point, he is described as 
having "piled upon that whale's white hump the sum of all the general rage and 
hate felt by his whole race from Adam down" (160). The British Captain, who has 
lost an arm to Moby Dick, behaves appropriately, by contrast. When Ahab asks him, 
"Didst thou cross his wake again?", Captain Boomer replies, "Twice." Boomer also 
gets three chances at Moby Dick. "But could not fasten?" persists Ahab. "Didn't 
want to try to: ain't one limb enough? What should I 90 without this other arm? 
21 Lacan, 10? 
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[ ... ] hark ye, he's best let alone; don't you think so, Captain?" (367-8). Captain 
Boomer challenges Moby Dick only once, and quickly realizes he is outmatched. 
He retreats, accepting his loss and respecting his opponent. He has, in Lacanian 
terms, learned, by challenging it, the strength of the "law of the father." Ahab, by 
contrast, responds: "What is best let alone, that accursed thing is not always what 
least allures. He's all a magnet!" (368). Those who fare best in the novel, in fact, 
are those who never even attempt to confront Moby Dick. When the Pequod meets 
the Bachelor, a ship whose voyage had been so successful that they "had just 
wedged in her last cask of oil, and bolted down her bursting hatches" (407), Ahab 
asks, "Hast seen the White Whale?" Their reply is "No; only heard of him; but 
don't believe in him at all" (408). A productive life, it seems, is based upon a 
healthy assimilation and suppression of the law of the father. 
The intensity of Ahab's hatred for the whale stems from his inability to accept 
and to suppress, as others do, what the whale has come to represent in his psychic 
makeup: the name of the father. The fact that Ahab has already done strange, 
violent and inhuman things before (Elijah asks Ishmael whether he has heard 
"about that thing that happened to [Ahab] off Cape Horn, long ago, when he lay 
like dead for three days and nights [ ... or] about that deadly skrimmage with the 
Spaniard?" [87]) helps to explain his violent reaction to Moby Dick. His problem, 
his aggression, started long before his encounte.r with the White Whale and the 
loss of his leg. Moby Dick is the final i1nage which Ahab makes sy1nbolic of his 
aggression. Again and again, Ahab denies, rejects the law of the father only to be 
struck down by it, for no one can live within society without a~hering to its rules. 
Ahab, in his quest, is trying to conquer and possess the authority of the law of the 
father, to capture the greatest phallus of them all, Moby Dick.22 
,_ 
22 See Jameson, 352. 
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Ahab seeks a way back to nature, a way to return to the state of unity once felt, 
but his desire is expressed through his desire to destroy that part of nature which, 
he feels, has separated him from it. But the two desires are related. Like another 
famous wounded (emasculated) protagonist, Jake Barnes in Hemingway's The Sun 
Also Rises, who sees a moment of unity between man and nature during a bullfight 
just as the matador joins himself to the bull through his sword,21 Ahab sees a 
possible unity with nature in his attempt to join himself ("strike through the mask" 
[144]) with the whale through his harpoon. Unlike Ishmael, however, Ahab does 
not merely long to be reunited, to return to a lost paradise, but deeply resents the 
original severance, and bears a grudge against the whale, who literally dismembered 
him, for also, figuratively speaking, separating him from nature. The great white 
whale becomes for Ahab that beastly phallic symbol of denial, an incarnate 
"imaginary" phallus which prevents him from going back to the warm, watery 
womb. Like a jealous child, he hates Moby Dick; he will not forgive the white 
whale, not only because it has wounded him, but because he thinks it separates 
him from his goal. He hates it for its impenetrability, its power, and its reminder 
to him of what he does not have: "He tasks me; he heaps me; I see in him 
outrageous strength [ ... ]. That inscrutable thing is chiefly what I hate; and [ ... ] I 
will wreak that hate upon him" (144). 
The whale Moby Dick can thus be seen as Ahab's Lacanian father, the visual 
barrier between him and his mother (nature)-the father that breaks the child 
away. It is important to recall that Ahab's mother died shortly after he was born, 
23 Ernest Hemingway, Tlze Si,11 Also Rises, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 
217. See also all of chapter 18. 
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and he apparently has no known natural father. 24 So, in a way, Ahab makes Moby 
Dick the father he never had, and Mother Nature the mother he never knew, 
moving the Oedipal scene to a more universal (Lacanian) level: instead of the child 
resenting his own father for separating him from his own mother, Ahab becomes 
the "baby man" projecting man's frustration of his separation from nature onto a 
po·werful (natural) male symbol, a whale. Ahab sees the whale as a "mask" or 
"wall", between him and the answer to his question/quest: "The white whale is that 
wall, shoved near to me" (144). He wants to find out what is "behind" this "wall" 
because it is the "ungraspable phantom" which holds the "key to it all" (14), and 
so he attempts to "strike through the mask" (144), even if the result be that "there's 
naught beyond" (144). In Lacanian terms, Ahab seeks to find the unity ("the 
ungraspable phantom") he lost when he was born into the self-conscious and 
individuated world of man, by striking "through the mask" of Moby Dick, and 
hopes in this unity to regain his "mother" nature ("the key to it all"). The whale 
is the wound of his-and of everyone's existence. In its opposition to individuality 
and mortality, it painfully reminds Ahab of that which he cannot have. 
We are told that Ahab "at last came to identify" with Moby Dick, with "not only 
. ·,. 
all his bodily woes, but all his intellectual and spiritual exasperations" (160), and 
that, at the very moment Ahab vainly tries to kill him the first time, "blindly 
seeking with a six inch blade to reach the fathom-deep life of the whale[ ... ] then 
it was, that suddenly sweeping his sickle-shaped lower jaw beneath him, Moby 
Dick had reaped away Ahab's leg" (159-160). Furthermore, we learn that Ahab 
replaces his lost leg with a whalebone .. He loses his leg (is "castrated") several times, 
and each time it is in connection with Moby Dick, first while pacing the deck 
24 Ahab's mother is obliquely referred to as "his crazy, widowed mother, who died 
when he was only a twelvemonth old" (77). 
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thinking about the "fiery hunt," then later on both the first and second days of the 
final hunt. In all these things, we see Ahab obsessed with his relationship to Moby 
Dick-again like a child struggling to come to terms with its own identity in 
opp·osition to the father and the rest Qf the world. He strikes out futilely with his 
six-inch blade against a "white phantom" only to be severed still further by it from 
his goal. Even when he looks into the water, he sees Moby Dick, not his own 
reflection: "But suddenly as he peered down and down into its depths, he 
profoundly saw a white living spot [ ... ] floating up from the undiscoverable 
botton1. It was Moby Dick's open mouth [ ... ]" and then Ahab, in his attempt to 
grasp the mouth, falls-like Narcissus-"flat-faced into the sea" (pp.448-449}.. Ahab 
in the end identifies so completely with the whale that he cannot see his own 
reflection, but only Moby Dick (who has no reflection of his own). 
Like Narcissus, Ahab, when he looks into the water, thinks he sees an image in 
nature, but what is really there is his own image on the surface, which, like the 
surface of the sea, cannot be penetrated. Ironically, what Ahab does not realize is 
that the "wall" (Moby Dick) is himself; the image which he thinks he will find 
"behind" Moby Dick is his own image reflected back from nature. He finds instead 
(like Narcissus) that, by looking too far, you only fall in and drown, because there 
is no access for us-no way back in that direction. The answer is in the source 
(man), not in the reflection (image). Ahab concludes his speech to the dead sperm 
~hale's head (which he has compared to the "Sphynx's in the desert'') with"[ ... ] 
. I 
and not one syllable is thine." Then a human voice is suddenly heard-"'Sail Ho!'" 
(264): it seems that, if he wants an answer to his quest(-ion), he must look to man, 
to himself, not to nature. This is Ahab's fatal mistake: he attempts the 
impossible-to achieve external unity by breaking away from the conscious and 
alienated self to reunite with unconscious and unindividuated nature. But this is 
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suicide; because he seeks his answer in the wrong place-without in the world, not 
within himself-he is doomed to fall into the watery void. 
* * * * * 
One could argue that Ahab ultimately achieves his goal; he does succeed in 
returning to the watery void of nature-when he dies. In fact, he even becomes 
one with nature via Moby Dick, who drags him down by means of Ahab's inferior 
phallic probe, his harpoon. The final image of the book suggests this unity: 
[ ... ] as the last whelmings intermixingly poured themselves over the sunken 
head of the Indian at the mainmast [ ... ] at that instant, a red arm and a 
hammer hovered backwardly uplifted in the open air, in the act of nailing 
the flag faster and yet faster to the subsiding spar. A sky-hawk that 
tauntingly had followed the main-truck [ ... ] this bird now chanced to 
intercept its broad fluttering wing between the hammer and the wood[ ... ] 
and so the bird of heaven [ ... ] went down with [Ahab's] ship. (469) 
As the ship sinks, man (here, the Indian) and nature (here, the sky hawk) are united 
at the moment of death, and sink together into primordial oblivion. Ahab is not 
able to strike through Moby Dick the father, for Ahab is a man and apart from 
nature, while Moby Dick is a whale and a part of nature; he, like Lacan's infant, 
/i 
cannot reunite with Mother Nature because he is a self-conscious, separated man, 
not integrated nature. He cannot go back-back to the primordial origins-because 
the only possibility for reunification is in death. Ahab tries to conceal the truth 
about the impossibility of going back "by positing [ ... ] a transcendent power 
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beyond, which then becomes the hated keeper of the secret, the enigma of 
origins."25 He is "a study in the psychology of resentment," an everyman example 
of the resentment we all carry against the "father," against "our loss of original 
unconscious;,vholeness [ ... ] against the specifically human task of developing 
consciousness. "26 
Moby-Dick is the story of human alienation, a condition which is the norm from 
a Lacanian perspective. There is no resolution at the end of the novel because there 
can be no resolution: "The story of the norm itself, of the Symbolic Order, is not 
that of a 'happy end,' but rather of a perpetual alienation."27 
25 Regis Durand, "'The Captive King': The Absent Father in Melville's Texts," in The 
Fictio11al Fat/1er, Robert Con Davis, ed. (Amherst: U. of Massachusetts Press, 1~), JU. 
, ~ •·. . ... . .. ..,._ . 
26 Edward F. Edinger, Melville's Moby Dick. A Ju1zgian Commentary (New York: A 
New Directions Book, 1975), 65. 
rJ Jameson, 37 4. 
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